

# Democracy and the Fragmentation of Discourses


*Artificial Intelligence between Science and the Humanities*



# The argument in one line

Democracy is not just many voices: it is the public organization of inquiry.

**Democracy opens public space.  
The scientific attitude keeps that space from  
becoming noise.**



# Democracy as public inquiry

Dewey and Habermas give the social and institutional frame.

## Dewey

Democracy is a mode of associated life: a public learns to identify shared consequences and respond intelligently.



## Habermas

Legitimacy depends on public justification: reasons are exchanged, criticized, and processed by institutions.



## Peircean Thesis

Openness is democratic only when it can become inquiry, correction, and public judgment.



shared  
consequences

public  
reasons

institutional  
processing

public  
judgment

# Peirce: scientific attitude

The scientific attitude is a disposition toward correction.

**“Do not block the way of inquiry.”**

*Peirce, CP 1.135*



C.S. Peirce

## Changed cradles


Science and philosophy did not exchange authority. Certain habits of inquiry shifted historically.

## Love of learning

Science is not the possession of knowledge, but diligent inquiry into truth for its own sake.

## Self-control

Inquiry requires willingness to be corrected and refusal to close investigation prematurely.



# Regulation means care of inquiry

A public discipline of conditions.

**Regulation = institutional and intellectual conditions that let inquiry continue**

## Not this

Suppression of disagreement  
Bureaucratic closure  
Institutional self-protection

## This

Terminological discipline  
Public criticizability  
Evidential responsibility  
Technical competence

## Aim

Make voices answerable to inquiry  
without closing democratic space.

**Regulate openness without blocking inquiry.**

*Peircean democratic task*

# AI turns words into obstacles

The same terms travel across discourses with different meanings.

## learning

engineering / education

## responsibility

law / system behavior

## authorship

writing / institutional trust

## bias

statistics / injustice

## intelligence

model performance / human capacity

## explainability

technical account / public justification

**We think we debate the same object.  
Our words move across incompatible  
meanings.**

*Terminological disorder*

**Not inquiry:  
confusion under discussion**

# Snow was more right than Leavis

The Two Cultures become a democratic problem in AI.

## Snow

A culture that cannot understand science cannot understand the world it must govern.



C.P. Snow

1959

## Leavis

Technical power needs humane judgment. given by literary culture.

- a useful warning, but not enough.



F.R.  
Leavis

1962

## The point

*Judgment cannot remain merely literary. Moral judgment must become inquiry.*

# Haack: scientific attitude without scientism

Humanities should not imitate natural science, but they must inquire seriously.

## Scientism

Reduces all serious inquiry to the prestige or method of natural science.

## Peircean third way

## Literary dilettantism

Treats style, conversation, sensitivity, or refinement as sufficient.



Haack

**Humanities matter when they study human problems with precision, evidential responsibility, terminological discipline, and public criticizability.**

# AI cannot be governed by one discourse

Technical expertise is necessary - but not sufficient.

technical  
expertise

law and  
rights

AI

education and  
authorship

institutions and  
public trust

philosophy and  
humanities

# The pro and con of democracy

Openness is a virtue only when it can become inquiry.

## PRO: openness

many voices  
experiences  
disciplines  
contestable reasons

## CON: fragmentation

noise  
fixed beliefs  
opaque systems  
terminological disorder


**Discussion is not enough if it does not become inquiry.**

# Conclusion

**Democracy is a social way of living that opens the public space.**

**The scientific attitude keeps that space from becoming noise.**

*The task before AI is not simply to include more voices, but to form institutions and disciplines that make those voices answerable to inquiry.*



**Thank you**

bnromo@up.edu.mx

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